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Revisiting Rokkan: On the Determinants of the Rise of Democracy in Europe

*Svante Ersson**

Abstract: This article is an attempt to extend Rokkan's analysis of the rise of democracy in western Europe also to include eastern Europe. Which relevance do Rokkan's factors - economy, territory, culture - have when applied to both western and eastern Europe? Through the mapping of the development of democracy following the four thresholds suggested by Rokkan - legitimacy, incorporation, representation, executive power - a crossnational analysis, based upon at most 28 cases, is made in order to test various explanatory factors. Territory and culture has an impact on the rise of democracy in Europe in general, but in particular on the passing of the First threshold of democracy, i.e. the legitimacy threshold. Other factors, not suggested by Rokkan, that are conducive to the rise of democracy are what kind of family systems that exists and the occurrences of elite settlements. Thus, Rokkan's main ideas about the rise of democracy in Western Europe also holds true when extended to cover the whole of Europe.

1. Introduction

It is obvious that the early 1990s is a period of marked political changes. We now faces the (re)making of many new nation-states - look at the extension of membership of the United Nations. While in the 1980s only one state (Brunei) was accepted as a member, in the 1990s so far (as of early 1995) 28 new nations has entered the ranks of the United Nations as members. In order to

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find a similar increase in UN-membership one must go back to the early 1960s and the end of colonialism in Africa. This means that state-making will be a feature of the 1990s.

Another feature may be the continued transitions to democracy from various forms of authoritarianism among the majority of the memberstates of the UN. These transitions have been identified as parts of long waves of democratization, but there has also over time been a series of reversals for democracy, to use the terminology of Huntington (1991: 16). It is indeed difficult to predict the direction of present developments: are we still in the third wave or are we perhaps entering the third reversal?

These observations indicate the relevance for our time of two subjects extensively dealt with by Stein Rokkan, viz. the nation- and state-building of the Western world and the formation of mass democracies in Western Europe. The problems that the new states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union face when institutionalising democratic institutions may therefore not only benefit from the experiences learned from Mediterranean Europe (Pridham 1990) or Latin America (Lijphart 1990) but also from Western Europe in the early 20th century (Lijphart 1992).

The aim of this paper is to map the process of democratization all over Europe from the 19th century down to the interwar period, thereby testing some of the models proposed by Rokkan for explaining the (non)introduction of democratic regimes in Europe. This means that the analysis is extended to cover eastern as well as western Europe, testing various explanatory models. Rokkan's models are compared with the explanatory power of competing models. It might also be necessary to add, that this is not a replication of a Rokkanian analysis, but rather an attempt at using a rather traditional crossnational design in the analysis for illuminating some of the problems that Rokkan did approach.

2. Rokkan's model of political development

Rokkan's work on the political development of Europe includes a lot of articles and chapters. Two major contributions that I will rely upon here are "Nation-building, cleavage formation and the structuring of mass politics" (Rokkan 1970) and "Territories, nations, parties: toward a geoeconomic - geopolitical model for the explanatory of variations within Western Europe" (Rokkan 1981). One major interpretative analysis of Rokkan's models is presented by Peter Flora (1981) in his "Stein Rokkans Makro-Modell der politischen Entwicklung Europas: ein Rekonstruktionsversuch". In addition, in recent years a lot of works evaluating the contribution of Rokkan have been published (Berntzen & Solle 1990; 1992; Immerfall 1992; Torgersen 1992; Hagtvet, 1992).

The three main explicanda Rokkan refer to in relation to the development of democracy in Europe are: (a) the institutional development of democracies (Rokkan 1970: 79-91); (b) the development of the party systems (Rokkan 1970: 112-137), and (c) the rise of fascism (Rokkan 1981: 84-93). In this paper the analysis will focus on the mapping of the institutionalization of four thresholds necessary for introducing democracy in Europe. The four institutional thresholds identified by Rokkan are legitimation (recognition of political rights and civil liberties), incorporation (rights of universal participation in elections), representation (possibility of new movements to be represented in national parliaments) and executive power (possibility of translation of parliamentary strength into executive power) (Rokkan 1970: 79). These thresholds in many respects equal the virtues of a liberal society, the extension of universal suffrage, the introduction of proportional election systems, and the acceptance of a parliamentary system.

Looking to the models used to explain the rise of democracy in Europe one may identify three major factors: economy (E), territory (T) and culture (C). Depending on various historical conditions - the time of the national revolutions (before 1789), or the time of the industrial revolutions (from 1800 to 1900 roughly) - these factors may have different impacts. The economy may imply the timing of the capitalist breakthrough or the rapidity of economic growth; territory is covered by geopolitical position (location in relation to the city belt), extent of periphery control or the timing of the national unification (early or late); culture contains information on the outcome of the reformation, the extent of ethno-linguistic mobilization or the strains in the church-state relations (Rokkan 1981: 74-75). On the basis of these general factors, it was possible for Rokkan to specify certain conditions conducive to the democratisation of Europe:

- the survival of an old tradition of representative institutions increases the chances of establishing a legitimate opposition (T);
- the extent of control of the periphery had implications for the aspirations of national independencies which could make rapid extension of suffrage possible (T);
- a well entrenched Catholic church on the other hand slowed down the process of democratization (Rokkan 1970: 82-83; 1981: 84).

The emphasis in Rokkan's explanatory models is put on historical conditions and structural factors. There is some, but not large space where political actors can act and modify the outcomes of these preconditioned and intervening process variables. One such exception is to be found in his discussion of conditions favouring proportional representation (PR). Only small resistance was mobilised against such a reform from the old establishment, since the PR secured some power-sharing for these groups in a new democratic regime (Rokkan 1970: 88-89).

3. Other alternative explanatory models.

Stein Rokkan was not alone in theorizing about the rise of European democracy. However much of what one may find in the writings of other theoreticians can also be traced in Rokkan. Somewhat crudely it is possible to distinguish between theories emphasising either historical structure (a la Rokkan) or more actor-oriented factors. The structural models cover developments in a long-run perspective identifying long waves, while actor-oriented models deal with short-run effects. Among the structural models it is appropriate to include Barrington Moore's thesis about the role of the upper landed classes for the rise of democratic rule. In particular, he stressed that "laborrepressive agrarian systems provide an unfavorable soil for the growth of democracy" (Moore 1966: 435), because in these systems there were no room for the formation of an independent merchant-oriented agrarian class interested in building coalitions with the rising capitalist class, together establishing democratic institutions. This idea has been further developed by John Stephens (1989) stressing the impact of a powerful landlord class. He writes that the "correlation between the strength of large landlords and the survival or breakdown of democracy in the interwar period ... indicates that this one factor provides a powerful explanation for the survival or demise of democracy" (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 83).

There are also structural approaches incorporating historical dimensions. One theme takes as a starting-point - as Rokkan - the geopolitical position, but tends to stress - more than Rokkan - the differences between western, central and eastern Europe (Szűcs 1990: 13-16; Gunst 1991: 82; Anderson 1974). The context is the relation between the centre (western Europe) and the periphery (eastern Europe) where the centre dominates over the periphery in terms of political and economic resources, making democracy easier to establish in the centre (Janos 1989: 356-357). Somewhat different is the approach one can find in Emmanuel Todd's analyses of family structures and ideological systems (Todd, 1983). His thesis is that there is some empirical covariation between kinds of family structures in Europe formed from the time of the French revolution and certain ideological patterns in Europe. He is able to distinguish four types of families based upon two dichotomies: freedom versus authority and inequality versus equality (Todd 1983: 13-18). An argument could be put forward that has relevance for the development of democracy: family systems stressing freedom may be more open for introducing civil liberties, while systems characterized by inequality may encourage the development of a capitalist ethic. Thus, the family system most conducive for the emergence of democracy would be what has been called the "famille nucléaire absolue" by Todd, as it stands for freedom and inequality.

The structuralist theories have a strong standing in this research tradition, made clear by Gregory M. Luebbert in concluding his analysis of interwar

Europe with: "One of the cardinal lessons of the story I have told is that leadership and meaningful choice played no role in the outcomes" (Luebbert 1991: 306), i.e. liberalism, fascism or social democracy.

So far we have dealt with more or less typical structural explanatory models, but there are in the literature available models that explore the possibilities of an actor-oriented approach. Following in the steps of Moore, Brian M. Downing focuses on the role of military involvement of the state in the early modern period of Europe, i.e. roughly the 17th century. His thesis is that the more of military involvement and the more of internal mobilising for warfare, the more probable that it may end in establishing a military-bureaucratic regime. It would tend to eliminate the traces of an earlier representative tradition, and consequently increase the difficulties in introducing a democratic regime (Downing 1992: 239).

It is evident that most actor-oriented theories focus on short-run developments. They also tend to look at the actors at the elite-level stressing the choices the actors confront at certain critical junctions. Depending upon the interests of the actors the skilled politician may choose the alternative that increases/decreases the possibility of securing a democratic development. In the words of Juan Linz: "These are the actions that constitute the true dynamics of the political process" (Linz 1978: 4). One problem with this approach is that it often has to rely upon detailed case studies in order to establish the impact of the choices made by different actors. Attempting at solving this problem John Higley and Michael Burton (1989; 1992) mapped the occurrences of elite settlements in Europe and Latin America. Their argument is that as a precondition for establishing a secure democracy there must exist an elite settlement; they argue that the earlier the elite settlement, the more favorable are the conditions for establishing democracy. The elite settlement represents a true corroboration of the existence of a consensus culture within the political system.

The models outlined may be looked upon as more or less compatible with Rokkan's models. Still it might be relevant to evaluate which parts of Rokkan's models that are most conducive to an understanding of the democratic development in the entire Europe. The models presented so far, to be tested later, include:

- geopolitical location: distance to the city belt (Rokkan)
- outcome of the reformation: strength of catholic church (Rokkan)
- ethno-linguistic mobilization (Rokkan)
- timing of capitalist breakthrough (Rokkan)
- survival of representative traditions (Rokkan)
- strength of an agrarian elite (Stephens; Moore)
- military involvement and internal mobilization (Downing)
- east-west dichotomy in Europe (Scüzs)
- family structures (Todd)
- elite-settlements (Higley and Burton).

4. Data and methods

The relevance of these models will be tested against the European experience, the cases selected for analysis consisting of the states of Europe existing in the interwar period. The choice is motivated by a conscious effort to increase the number of cases used in an analysis like this, or what Lijphart (1971; 1975) calls case-stretching. This is a practice already accepted. In many studies, to give an example, Finland has been considered one case for the 19th century or the early 20th century, although a Finnish state was not established until 1917. This means, however, that for the states not yet formed at the turn of the century, proxies for different variables had to be estimated.

A number of indicators will be employed in order to take account of the country variation with regard to the introduction of democratic procedures in Europe. In many instances these indicators are crude, but they still represent a meaningful structuration in distinguishing an early road from a later road to democracy. The same comments apply to the choice of indicators for the set of independent variables used in the analysis to follow.

Most of the data consists of simple classifications of the nation-states in question. These classifications may take the form of dichotomies or trichotomies, which, however, may be interpreted as approximations of data scaled on an interval-level. This also makes it possible to apply correlation and regression analyses to these data. It is motivated by the fact that such estimation techniques in general are very robust, even in cases when the data are scaled on nominal data as sometimes is the case in this analysis. It is also important to remember that the purpose of the use of these statistical techniques is not primarily to draw any general inferences from the estimations, but to use a technique that allows for a systematic treatment of a dataset.

One might also add, that in order to present an analysis true to the intentions of Rokkan and taking account of all the complexities in his argument about complicated causal mechanisms relevant for various cases, more of a detailed case approach would be needed (cf Tilly 1984: 129-143; Ragin 1987: 126-133). Such an enterprise, however, is not attempted at here.

5. Mapping the development of democracy in Europe

In order to map the development of democracy in Europe it is appropriate to choose the set of democratic thresholds suggested by Rokkan. An attempt is made to cover the passing of these thresholds for the European states discussed above. Let us begin with the passing of the legitimacy threshold.

5.1 The threshold of legitimacy

This threshold may be identified as the introduction of civil liberties, not only in a formal mode but also in a real mode. In a certain sense one may say that it equals the right to voice as Hirschman would phrase it (Hirschman 1970). There are no clearcut measures available to identify the timing of these liberties, why different proxy variables will be relied upon to catch the variation in time and space.

Three aspects will be considered here: the breakthrough in time of economic liberalism, the establishment in time of civil liberties, and the time for the formation of socialist parties in Europe. These aspects are then added to form a rough composite measure of the breakthrough of legitimacy in Europe. Introducing economic liberalism paved the way for a step-wise establishment of civil liberties, while the formation of socialist parties may be looked upon as a test of the reality of the civil liberties implemented.

To begin with economic liberalism, one may identify two components. On one hand we have the timing of a free trade legislation during the 19th century (up to circa 1870) and on another hand there is the degree of protectionism (measured as custom tariffs) employed in the period ending with the First World War. The earlier the introduction of free trade and the lower the tariffs used, the more there is of a tradition of economic liberalism. And a tradition of economic liberalism may indeed be considered a precondition of political liberalism.

There are two components that catch the variation in the introduction of civil liberties: the first legislation on press freedom, and the first legislation indicating the freedom of associations. The earlier the introduction of these liberties, the stronger the tradition of liberalism is.

The final indicator takes into account the systems acceptance of an oppositional political force, the socialist parties. The earlier the forming of these parties and the earlier its parliamentary representation, the more firmly rooted the political rights will be. These cases where no socialist parties were founded are here classified as latecomers, since their absence probably was a consequence of an underdeveloped and traditional societal setting (Albania).

These measures and the introduction of liberal or legitimate rule in Europe are added and presented in Table 5.1.3 (LEG1; LEG2). Although the covariation between the measures is far from perfect, it is evident that one can identify a set of countries where this process took off at an earlier stage: Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Another cluster of countries consists of these where this process had a late breakthrough: Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, Romania, Albania, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Yugoslavia. Somewhere in between the set of the remaining countries belongs: Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Austria, France, Italy, Hungary, Portugal and Spain. Of course, this classification is somewhat arbitrary, but some crude criteria are resorted to and the pattern that becomes visible meets with a certain intuitive common sense.

Table 5.1.1:

The breakthrough of liberal reforms in Europe

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Alb	-	LAT	-	-	HIG	-	-	LAT
Aus	1853	MID	18	22.8	MED	1867	1867	MID
Bel	1849-53	EAR	9	14.2	LOW	1831	1831	EAR
Bul	-	LAT	-	22.8	HIG	-	[1879]	LAT
Cze	-	MID	-	22.8	MED	-	-	MID
Den	1850-51	EAR	14	-	MED	1849	1866	EAR
Est	-	LAT	-	-	HIG	-	-	LAT
Fin	-	LAT	-	35.0	HIG	-	-	LAT
Fra	1860	MID	20	23.6	MED	1789 1870	1791 1881	EAR
Ger	1834-50	EAR	13	16.7	MED	1848 1871	1848	MID
Gre	-	LAT	-	-	MED	1844	1864	MID
Hun	-	MID	18	22.8	MED	1867	1868	MID
Ire	-	EAR	-	-	LOW	-	-	EAR
Ita	1860	MID	18	24.8	MED	1848	1848	MID
Lat	-	LAT	-	-	HIG	-	-	LAT
Lit	-	LAT	-	-	HIG	-	-	LAT
Lux	-	EAR	-	-	LOW	-	-	MID
Net	1845	EAR	4	-	LOW	1815 1848	1848	EAR
Nor	1850-51	EAR	-	-	MED	1814	-	EAR
Pol	-	LAT	-	72.5	HIG	-	-	LAT
Por	1850-51	EAR	-	-	HIG	1821	1885	LAT
Rom	-	LAT	-	30.3	HIG	1866	1866	LAT
Spa	1860	MID	41	37.0	HIG	1812 1876	1876	LAT
Swe	1859	MID	20	27.6	MED	1812	1864	EAR
Swi	1850-51	EAR	9	10.5	LOW	1848 1874	1874	MID
UK	1846	EAR	0	-	LOW	1776 1870	1769 1846	EAR
Rus	-	LAT	38	-	HIG	1861 1905	[1905]	LAT
Yug	-	LAT	-	22.2	HIG	-	1888	LAT

Notes:

- (1) refers to country code available in Appendix 2
- (2) refers to approx. time for introducing free-trade legislation
- (3) approx. classification of time according to (2)
- (4) refers to approx. level of custom tariffs before 1914
- (5) the same, based on another dataset
- (6) approx. classification of size of level of tariff according to (4) and (5)
- (7) refers to approx. introduction of press freedom
- (8) refers to approx. introduction of freedom of association
- (9) approx. introduction in time of liberal reforms Those classifications made refers either to time (EAR=early, MID=mid, LAT=late), or importance (HIG=high; MED=medium; LOW=low).

Sources:

- (2): Rees 1932: Kindleberger 1975; Pollard 1981: 255-7
- (4): Pollard 1981: 259
- (5): Drabek 1985: 476
- (7): Encyclopaedia Britannica 1911: 300-4; Goldstein 1983: 35
- (8): Loening 1894

Table 5.1.2:

The breakthrough of socialist parties in European politics

(1)	(2)		(3)	(4)	(5)
Alb	-		LAT	-	LAT
Aus	1874*	1889	EAR	1897	LAT
Bel	1879	1885*	MID	1894*	MID
Bul	1891 *		MID	1894*	MID
Cze	1878*		EAR	1897*	MID
Den	1871 *		EAR	1884*	EAR
Est	1905	1917*	LAT	1907*	LAT
Fin	1899*		LAT	1907*	LAT
Fra	1879	1905*	LAT	1893*	MID
Ger	1863*	1875	EAR	1867	1871 * EAR
Gre	1918*		LAT	1901 *	LAT
Hun	1880	1890*	MID	1905*	LAT
Ire	1896	1912*	LAT	1922*	LAT
Ita	1892*		MID	1895*	MID
Lat	1904*		LAT	1907*	LAT
Lit	1895*	1896	LAT	1907*	LAT
Lux	1902*		LAT	1896*	MID
Net	1882	1894*	MID	1888*	EAR
Nor	1887*		MID	1903*	LAT
Pol	1892*	1894	MID	1897*	MID
Por	1875*		EAR	1911*	LAT
Rom	1893*		MID	1888	1900* LAT
Spa	1879*		EAR	1910*	LAT
Swe	1889*		MID	1896*	MID
Swi	1880	1888*	MID	1896*	MID
UK	1884	1900*	LAT	1900*	LAT
Rus	1898*		LAT	1906*	LAT
Yug	1894	1901 *	LAT	1903*	LAT

Notes:

(1) refers to the country code

(2) refers to the founding year of socialist parties

(3) approx. classification in time according to (2)

(4) refers to the First time representation of socialist parties in parliament

(5) approx. classification in time according to (3) The classifications made refers to time (EAR=early, MID=mid, LAT=late) The years with a star (*) are those that conventionally are referred to for the socialist parties

Sources:

(2): Wende 1981; McHale 1983; Fricke 1976; Schumacher et al. 1986

(4): Mackie & Rose 1982; Stemberger/Vogel 1969

Table 5.1.3:

The threshold of legitimacy

CODE	LEGITIMACY I	SCORES 11	CODE	LEGITIMACY 1	SCORES II
Alb	10	0	Lat	10	0
Aus	5	1	Lit	10	0
Bel	2	2	Lux	4	1
Bul	8	0	Net	1	2
Cze	4	1	Nor	4	1
Den	1	2	Pol	8	0
Est	10	0	Por	6	1
Fin	10	1	Rom	9	0
Fra	5	1	Spa	7	1
Ger	2	2	Swe	4	1
Gre	8	0	Swi	3	2
Hun	6	1	UK	3	2
Ire	4	1	Rus	10	0
Ita	5	1	Yug	10	0

Note:

These scores are based upon the classifications made in tables 5.1.1 and 5.1.2; Leg 1 scores: the higher the value, the later the introduction of legitimate rule; Leg 11 scores: the higher the value, the earlier the introduction of legitimate rule.

5.2 The threshold of incorporation

The introduction of civil liberties and political rights made it meaningful to form political parties. And the parties made efforts to mobilise members and parts of the electorate in order to secure a position within the political system. The crucial condition for fulfilling this was the introduction of universal suffrage, which equals the passing of the threshold of incorporation. This threshold may be captured by measures on the introduction of male and female (i.e. universal) suffrage as well as estimates of the proportion of the population franchised some time around 1900 (i.e. from 1900 to 1910). These indicators are portrayed in Table 5.2 below. The dates reported refer to the first time employment of the new rules for extended suffrage. It is notable that there are marked differences for some countries between the time of the introduction of male respectively female suffrage. This is the case for countries like Greece, Switzerland and France. On the other hand, in countries like Finland, Denmark and Poland it was introduced at the same time. This means that an early

Table 5.2:

The threshold of incorporation

CODE	SUFFRAGE		% FRAN- CHISED IN 1900 (AP- PROX)	CODE	SUFFRAGE		% FRAN- CHISED IN 1900 (AP- PROX)
	FOR MEN	WO- MEN			FOR MEN	WO- MEN	
Alb	1921	1945	0	Lat	1917	1917	0
Aus	1907	1919	1	Lit	1917	1917	0
Bel	1893	1948	2	Lux	1918	1919	8
Bul	1879	1945	2	Net	1917	1919	11
Cze	1907	1920	1	Nor	1898	1913	20
Den	1915	1915	1	Pol	1918	1918	5
Est	1917	1917	0	Por	1974	1974	10
Fin	1906	1906	4	Rom	1917	1946	1
Fra	1848	1944	2	Spa	1869	1931	23
Ger	1871	1919	2	Swe	1909	1921	6
Gre	1844	1952	2	Swi	1848	1971	32
Hun	1919	1945	6	UK	1918	1928	16
Ire	1918	1923	1	Rus	1917	1917	0
Ita	1919	1946	7	Yug	1920	1946	5

Sources:

Nohlen 1978; Hewitt 1977; Rokkan/Meyriat 1969; Rokkan 1970; Mackie/Rose 1982; Sternberger/Vogel 1969; Derbyshire/Derbyshire 1991; Gerlich 1973; Hoensch 1988; Anderson/Anderson 1967; Flora 1983.

introduction of male suffrage does not imply an early introduction of universal suffrage. Looking at the proportion of the population franchised at the beginning of the 20th century it seems to be the case that the earlier the male suffrage was introduced, the larger the proportion of the population franchised. This means that in an early period of democratic development the timing of the male suffrage may be the best measure on democratization.

5.3 The threshold of representation

According to democratic theory two preconditions for a democratic polity are extended civil liberties and political rights, but also the employment of an universal suffrage in free elections. The threshold of representation that more or less equals the use of proportional representation in the electoral system is no such precondition. In the European context, however, the introduction of PR

formulas has often been one component in the battle for establishing a democratic regime; there is in fact only one exception and that is, of course, the United Kingdom. The PR system imply that once universal suffrage is achieved the judgement made by the electorate at elections should be fairly or proportionately translated into mandates in Parliament.

Table 5.3 contains the timing of the introduction of the PR formulas in Europe. An early introduction of PR in Belgium is well-known, but one may note that in Serbia (or Yugoslavia) there was a PR system in use as early as 1890. It is also remarkable that countries like Finland and Bulgaria entered this system at an rather early date, while it was in reality first used in France in 1945 and in Spain as late as 1977.

Table 5.3:

The threshold of representation

CODE	INTRODUCTION OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION	CODE	INTRODUCTION OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
Alb	1946	Lat	1920
Aus	1918	Lit	1920
Bel	1899	Lux	1919
Bul	1912	Net	1917
Cze	1920	Nor	1919
Den	1915	Pol	1918
Est	1920	Por	1910
Fin	1906	Rom	1918
Fra	1945	Spa	1977
Ger	1919	Swe	1907
Gre	1926	Swi	1919
Hun	1938	UK	-
Ire	1921	Rus	1917
Ita	1919	Yug	1890

Sources:

Sternberger/Vogel 1969, Rokkan/Meyriat 1969; Mackie/ Rose 1982.

5.4 The threshold of executive power

If one remebers the European context it is also meaningful to look upon the establishment of an relation between the power of Parliament and the power of the executive, i.e. the implementation of the parliamentary principle. The struggle for establishing parliamentarianism was in many European countries the last step in securing a democratic regime.

An attempt is made in Table 5.4 to map the timing of the introduction of a parliamentary regime. In most cases this meets with small problems, but for some authoritarian regimes (Portugal, Spain, Hungary) the dates chosen may be a matter of argument. It is also questionable whether Albania or Russia even today has established a parliamentary system. What is obvious from the table is that there are huge time spans separating the British case from most other cases.

Table 5.4:

The threshold of executive power

CODE	INTRODUCTION OF PARLIAMEN- TARY RULE	CODE	INTRODUCTION OF PARLIAMEN TARY RULE
Alb	-	Lat	1922
Aus	1918	Lit	1922
Bel	1831	Lux	1868
Bul	1919	Net	1868
Cze	1920	Nor	1884
Den	1901	Pol	1919
Est	1920	Por	1911
Fin	1919	Rom	1923
Fra	1875	Spa	1931
Ger	1918	Swe	1917
Gre	1910	Swi	1919
Hun	1926	UK	1741
Ire	1922	Rus	-
Ita	1876	Yug	1921

Sources:

Gerlach 1973; Hewitt 1977; Nohlen 1978; Sternberger/Vogel 1969

When summarising the development of democratic rule in Europe there are two aspects that will be stressed. What sequences in time do different countries follow when introducing the democratic regime? What is the covariation between the four thresholds selected when comparing nations?

The ideal sequence proposed by Rokkan was legitimization, incorporation, representation and execution. Among the European states looked upon, most of them come quite close to that sequence. There are two types of deviating cases, on the one hand those where the parliamentary principle was introduced at an quite early stage (United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway), and on the other hand those where PR systems were introduced at an early stage (Portugal and Yugoslavia) or a rather late stage (Greece, Hungary and Spain).

What about the interaction between the various phases of democratic development? Estimating some simple correlations between the variables outlined in Table 5.1.1 to 5.4, one may get a crude overview of what kind of relations there are. Surprisingly, the matrix portrayed in Table 5.5 gives the overall impression that these phases in general are rather weakly interrelated. An early passing of the legitimacy threshold does not mean that an early incorporation or representation may be expected. These phases are related in a logical way, but empirically there is an important variation in time and space. The finding is that the introduction and development of democratic regimes in Europe was not an unidimensional phenomenon.

Table 5.5:

Correlation matrix for the variables indicating the development of democracy in Europe

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Legitimacy 1	1.00						
(2) Legitimacy 11	-.90	1.00					
(3) Male suffrage	.16	-.15	1.00				
(4) Female suffrage	-.01	.02	-.14	1.00			
(5) Approx. franchise 1900	-.35	.51	-.59	.06	1.00		
(6) Proportional representation	.07	-.05	-.34	.05	.04	1.00	
(7) Parliamentarianism	.46	-.50	-.05	-.01	-.08	-.45	1.00

Note:

The correlation analyses are based upon 28 cases with the exception for proportional representation where N=27 (not the UK), and parliamentarianism where N=26 (not Albania and Russia/USSR).

6. Explaining the variation in development of democracy in Europe.

What will account for the variation in the development of European democracy as mapped in the previous section? What is the relevance of Rokkan's models? Are they more able to explain the variation than other competing models? These are the questions to be answered here.

It might be fruitful to follow Rokkan's distinction between various master variables - territory, culture, economy - in this analysis, where what here will

be called political variables are to be added. The starting-point will be the relevance of territory or geopolitical location for the development of democracy in Europe. This aspect is covered by three variables; the first one (CPR) simply indicates the center-periphery distinction made by Rokkan (1981: 78); the second one (LORE) is based upon a classification suggested by Janos (1989: 123), while the third (WEST) tries to capture the separation of Europe in a western, central and eastern part (Szücs, 1990: 16). All three variables are scaled so that the higher the value, the more of center or core or westwardness. The data for these explanatory variables are presented in Appendix 1.

The correlation matrix in Table 6.1 gives an indication of how democratic development covaries with the territorial division of Europe. There is no doubt that there is a covariation between geopolitical position and the passing of the legitimacy threshold, First done in the core city-Belt of western Europe, reaching the eastern part at a later stage. The same applies to the introduction of parliamentarianism, although the connection loosens somewhat in strength when cases like Albania and Russia are eliminated. The other dependent variables show an expected sign, but the pattern is not uniform. Still it is a matter of fact that the territorial division of Europe had an impact on the pattern of democratic development. The next step in the analysis belongs to the cultural sphere. Maybe the Roman-catholic church was responsible for a delay in the democratization of Europe? Does the potential for an ethno-linguistic mobilization create problem for a democratic development? Is it the case that the family structures that seems to be most compatible with a capitalist development also stimulates democratic development? The correlation matrix in Table 6.2 suggests a crude answer to these questions. It is a striking fact that only one of the cultural variables show any strong relationship with the dependent variables, and it is the family structure variable (TODD). The strength of the Roman-catholic church (RC) as it is measured by estimates of its size from circa 1900 do not go together with any of the phases of democratic development. The potential for ethno-linguistic mobilization (measured by various indicators of ethnic fragmentation) (ELF, ELN, DOMI; DOM2) covaries weakly negative with legitimacy, and this is the only stable relationship to report.

Turning to the economic variables they capture on the one hand the timing of the capitalist breakthrough in Europe (the Rokkan model) and on the other hand the strength of the agrarian elite in the 19th century (the Moore model). As a proxy for the capitalist breakthrough data about the GNP/capita around 1830 (Bairoch 1982) has formed the Basis for classifying countries as belonging to an earlier period or a later period (GNP). The strength of the agrarian elite is measured by two measures: (AG 1) the existence or non-existence of a large agrarian elite as suggested by Stephens (1989: 234) and (AG2) the existence or non-existence of large landowners as presented by Urwin (1980: 123). As is evident from the correlation matrix in Table 6.3 there are some instances of a

Table 6.1:

Correlation matrix: democratic development and the territorial dimension

Democratic development							
Terr. dimen.	LEG 1 (1)	LEG 11 (2)	SUFF M (3)	SUFF F (4)	FR 1900 (5)	PROP REP (6)	PARL (7)
CPR	-.77	.77	-.12	.14	.30	.08	-.40
CORE	-.88	.84	-.09	-.07	.24	-.14	-.69
WEST	-.80 (N=28)	.80 (N=28)	-.02 (N=28)	-.14 (N=28)	.35 (N=28)	.09 (N=27)	-.36 (N=26)

Notes:

(1) and (2) sec table 5.1.3; (3), (4) and (5) sec table 5.2; (6) sec table 5.3,
 (7) sec table 5.4; CPR, CORE and WEST are explained in Appendix 1.

Table 6.2:

Correlation matrix: democratic development and the cultural dimension

Democratic development							
Cult. dimen.	LEG 1 (1)	LEG 11 (2)	SUFF M (3)	SUFF F (4)	FR 1900 (5)	PROP REP (6)	PARL (7)
RC 1	-.25	.20	.07	.19	.04	.22	.02
RC2	-.21	.16	.10	.21	.00	.23	.02
ELF	.33	-.29	-.11	.01	-.09	-.04	.23
ELN	.23	-.22	-.05	-.03	-.09	-.06	.18
DOM I	-.22	.19	.11	-.03	.04	.07	-.14
DOM2	-.29	.27	.03	-.08	.12	.20	-.18
TODD	-.82 (N=28)	.71 (N=28)	-.08 (N=28)	-.01 (N=28)	.24 (N=28)	.03 (N=27)	-.55 (N=26)

Notes:

(1) and (2) sec table 5.1.3; (3), (4) and (5) sec table 5.2; (6) sec table 5.3;
 (7) sec table 5.4, RC1, RC2, ELF, ELN DOM1, DOM2 and TODD are
 explained in Appendix 1.

Table 6.3:

Correlation matrix: democratic development and the economic dimension

Econ. dimen.	Democratic development						
	LEG I (1)	LEG II (2)	SUFF M (3)	SUFF F (4)	FR 1900 (5)	PROP REP (6)	PARL (7)
GNP	-.65	.66	-.18	.17	.38	.16	-.47
AG1	.40	-.44	.19	.06	-.35	.07	.24
AG2	.44	-.30	.32	-.13	-.26	.17	.41
	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=27)	(N=26)

Notes:

(1) and (2) sec table 5.1.3; (3), (4) and (5) sec table 5.2; (6) sec table 5.3;
 (7) sec table 5.4; GNP, AG 1 and AG2 are explained in Appendix 1.

Table 6.4:

Correlation matrix: democratic development and the political dimension

Polit. dimen.	Democratic development						
	LEG I (1)	LEG II (2)	SUFF M (3)	SUFF F (4)	FR 1900 (5)	PROP REP (6)	PARL (7)
CONST	-.47	.51	.10	-.06	.25	-.13	-.33
MILIT	.16	-.22	-.09	-.27	-.24	.17	.27
ELITE	-.73	.74	-.15	-.13	.35	-.21	-.55
	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=27)	(N=26)

Notes:

(1) and (2) sec table 5.1.3, (3), (4) and (5) sec table 5.2; (6) sec table 5.3;
 (7) sec table 5.4; CONST, MILIT and ELITE are explained in Appendix 1.

covariation. An early capitalist breakthrough and a weak agrarian elite tends to go together with an early passing of the legitimacy threshold. Otherwise these two sets of explanatory variables shows the expected signs, but the strength of the relationships are generally low. What has been called the political variables represents the final set of the explanatory variables. It is meaningful to call them political since they may be considered to be the consequences of actions taken by political authorities. The First one (CONST) is an indicator that tries to capture the survival of representative institutions from the Middle Ages to the 19th century. This means that it considers the existence of early parliamentary estates (Myers 1975) as well as the possibilities for the absolutist regimes to break such traditions (Miller 1990); the higher the value, the more of survival. The second variable (MILIT) catches the involvement in wars and the resulting internal resource mobilisation in the 17th century as suggested by Downing (1992). The final variable an elite settlement (ELITE) is inspired by Higley and Burton (1989; 1992) and tries to classify political systems with respect to the establishment of a consensual political culture as it is manifested by elite settlements. This classification may be open for argument, but here it is suggested that we distinguish between an early settlement, a late settlement (i.e. there was a potential for an earlier settlement), and no settlement. Table 6.4 contains the relevant correlation matrix. The pattern is similar to the one in the previous table. The legitimacy threshold and the introduction of parliamentary regime covaries with CONST and ELITE, and these variables do also show the expected sign when considering the extension of franchise around 1900. The military involvement variable (MILIT) shows no strong covariation with the dependent variables, although such a tradition of military involvement may hamper the introduction of legitimate rule and the extension of the franchise.

The dependent variables consists of the four thresholds of democratic development. Among them it is only the earliest one, legitimacy, that shows a covariation with the explanatory variables. And Among the four sets of independent variables territory and culture seem to have a greater impact on the dependent variables than economy and politics.

Let us now take a more systematic look upon how well different models explain the variation in democratic development. In order to make such an evaluation a series of regression equations have been estimated. In a first step the different dependent variables has been regressed against four different blocks of independent variables, each block representing a territorial model, a cultural model, an economic model and a political model. If one compares the relative impact each block has on the dependent variables one may get a rough picture about which models that matter as well as their relative importance when compared with other models. This impact is measured with the adjusted R square, which takes into consideration the different numbers of independent variables used. Table 6.5 contains an overview of these estimations. The same findings emerge as from the correlation analyses. These models are relevant to

Table 6.5:

Regression analyses: the outcome of block regressions on the variables measuring democratic development: R2A

Democratic development							
Bloc	LEG	LEG	SUFF	SUFF	FR	PROP	PARL
regr.	1	11	M	F	1900	REP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Territ.	.84	.79	.00	.08	.01	.00	.44
Cultural	.86	.67	.07	.00	.02	.13	.14
Economic	.45	.48	.05	.00	.12	.00	.20
Political	.49	.52	.00	.03	.03	.00	.21
	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=27)	(N=26)

Notes:

(1) and (2) see table 5.1.3; (3), (4) and (5) see table 5.2; (6) see table 5.3; (7) see table 5.4; the block dimensions are explained in Appendix 1.

Table 6.6:

Regression analyses: the outcome of residual analyses.

Democratic development							
	LEG	LEG	SUFF	SUFF	FR	PROP	PARL
	1	11	M	F	1900	REP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
R2A Residuals:	.88	.78	.02	.03	.14	.12	.48
West	5	12	6	6	5	5	6
East	4	2	4	4	5	4	3
	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=28)	(N=27)	(N=26)

Notes:

(1) and (2) see table 5.1.3; (3), (4) and (5) see table 5.2; (6) see table 5.3; (7) see table 5.4; the block dimensions are explained in Appendix 1.

the understanding of the country variation in the passing of the thresholds of legitimacy and the introduction of parliamentary systems. The variation in the introduction of the other thresholds is more difficult to account for. The models that matter seem in the first instance to be territory and culture, but economy and politics also have an impact.

Looking further into these models it is possible to discern the impact of various factors, viz. those of a Rokkanian origin versus other factors. Within the territorial factor-block it is evident that LORE shows the strongest impact, while TODD plays the same role among the cultural variables. The other variables that have an impact are GNP (economic bloc) and ELITE (political bloc). This means that the impact of the Rokkan model (CORE, GNP) is as relevant as the impact of other models (TODD, ELITE).

Another finding from the testing of the models is that it is possible to estimate models that can explain the variation in the timing of the legitimacy threshold, while explaining the variation in the other thresholds meets with problems. What seems to matter most with regard to the introduction of the legitimacy threshold is territory and culture. The geopolitical position within the core of Europe and a cultural environment that encouraged the development of a capitalist ethic (freedom and inequality) was conducive to an early introduction of the virtues of a civil society, i.e. the legitimization threshold. This is evident from the regression equations estimated below. The first one (EQ 1) portrays this relationship, while the second one (EQ 2) indicates that there probably is an interaction effect for territory and culture (CORE and TODD). The simultaneous effect of territory and culture did apparently further stimulate an earlier rise of the legitimate state.

$$\text{EQ 1: LEG 1} = 9.4 - 2.7 \cdot \text{CORE} - 2.0 \cdot \text{TODD} \quad \text{AdjRSq} = .85$$

T-stat	25.4	-5.9	-4.0
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$$\text{EQ 2: LEG1} = 9.9 - 4.3 \cdot \text{CORE} - 2.9 \cdot \text{TODD} + 1.5 \cdot \text{CORE} \cdot \text{TOD} \quad \text{AdjRSq} = .89$$

T stat	27.7	-6.8	-5.6	3.2
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The relevance of these models may be further enlightened by looking at the cases that fit the general pattern and those cases that deviate. For each of the five dependent variables constituting the block of democratic development, regression equations have been estimated that include variables from the models discussed above. The purpose of these regressions is to analyse the residuals estimated in order to find out if the cases that deviate mostly may be found in eastern or in western Europe; western Europe here refers to the set of nations most often studied by Rokkan (17 western and 11 eastern). In Table 6.6 the outcome of these analyses is presented. In general there is no clearcut pattern when looking at the deviating cases. Mostly there are as many eastern cases as could be expected. There is, however, one exception and it concerns one of the legitimacy variables (LEG2) where almost all deviating cases are to be found in the western part of Europe. It may be interpreted as that the model

in question somewhat better catches the variation in the introduction of legitimacy in eastern Europe. The general conclusion to be drawn is thus that the models used for explaining the variation in European democratic development is as relevant for eastern Europe as it is for western Europe.

7. Conclusion

There is indeed a variation in the timing of the rise of democracy in Europe. In general it follows the pattern suggested by Rokkan, meaning that the threshold of legitimacy is passed first, to be followed by the thresholds of incorporation, representation and execution of power. Among them only the timing of the legitimacy threshold seems to be possible to account for fully with respect to the models tested here. The reason for this may be either that the models tested are inadequate or that the legitimacy threshold is quite distinct and differs from the other thresholds.

Let us first look at the models tested. In terms of the Rokkan models, territory as well as culture are important components. This is only true to a lesser extent of economy, in the present configuration, and politics. In revisiting Rokkan's models for all over Europe, the Endings may be looked upon as indicating the general relevance of his models, but it is meaningful to incorporate some other factors not addressed by Rokkan, such as family structures (TODD) or elite settlements (ELITE). They furthermore appears to be relevant for the western as well as the eastern part of Europe. It is, however, also necessary to stress that the causal impact of these structural factors is not a general one, and that they may be overcome by political actions taken by a political leadership. These factors have obviously been insufficiently covered by the models tested.

The introduction of legitimacy rule in a political system says something decisive about the prospects for establishing a democratic polity. The introduction of universal suffrage, however, is only a necessary condition for a democratic regime, but not a sufficient condition. This means that the timing of the introduction of universal suffrage may be dependent upon many short-term factors. And consequently it might be difficult to account for the timing of this threshold.

An early introduction of democracy does not mean the establishment of a stable democracy. Other mechanisms are operating when it comes to the stability of democracy, although an early rise of democracy might be conducive for its stability. The longer period a political system has been exposed to a political culture engrained by liberal values, the better the prospects for forming a stable democracy would be. In this respect, the findings in this analysis regarding factors that have an impact on the introduction of the legitimacy threshold, are relevant for an understanding of the stability of democracy in Europe.

APPENDIX 1: The set of independent variables

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Alb	0	0	0	9.6	10	.04	1.04	98.0	94.3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Aus	1	1	2	92.1	91	.08	1.08	96.1	96.8	1	1	1	0	3	2	1
Bel	1	2	2	99.0	99	.55	2.21	50.8	56.1	1	1	0	0	3	1	1
Bul	0	0	0	.8	1	.29	1.41	83.4	86.0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0
Cze	1	1	2	90.1	78	.67	2.99	50.4	49.8	1	1	1	0	2	2	0
Den	1	1	2	.4	1	.03	1.03	98.7	98.8	2	0	0	0	1	1	1
Est	0	0	1	.2	0	.24	1.31	86.8	89.0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0
Fin	0	0	1	.0	0	.20	1.25	88.7	88.7	0	0	0	1	3	0	1
Fra	1	1	2	97.1	98	.16	1.19	91.7	94.7	1	1	0	0	1	2	1
Ger	1	1	2	47.0	32	.05	1.05	97.6	98.3	1	1	1	1	3	2	1
Gre	0	0	0	1.8	1	.08	1.09	95.7	93.5	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
Hun	0	1	1	64.2	67	.19	1.24	89.6	90.3	0	0	1	1	2	2	0
Ire	0	1	2	89.6	93	.16	1.19	91.2	86.7	1	0	1	1	5	0	1
Ita	1	1	2	99.6	100	.08	1.08	96.1	97.5	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Lat	0	0	1	26.8	33	.47	1.90	71.3	74.0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0
Lit	0	0	1	80.5	86	.28	1.40	84.2	80.9	0	0	1	1	4	2	0
Lux	1	1	2	98.5	99	.24	1.32	87.0	87.0	1	1	0	0	4	1	2
Net	1	2	2	35.6	37	.08	1.09	95.7	95.7	2	1	0	0	4	1	2
Nor	0	1	2	.1	0	.02	1.02	99.2	99.2	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
Pol	0	0	1	78.5	75	.51	2.02	68.1	69.5	1	0	1	1	4	1	0
Por	1	0	2	100.0	100	.00	1.00	100.0	100.0	1	1	1	1	3	0	0
Rom	0	0	0	1.5	15	.42	1.72	75.5	64.2	1	0	1	1	1	2	0
Spa	1	0	2	100.0	100	.50	1.99	67.2	76.9	1	1	1	1	2	1	0
Swe	1	1	2	.0	1	.01	1.01	99.4	99.5	1	0	0	0	3	0	2
Swi	1	1	2	41.6	41	.45	1.81	70.9	70.7	1	1	0	0	4	0	2
UK	1	2	2	6.6	6	.05	1.06	97.3	97.3	2	1	1	0	5	0	2
Rus	0	0	0	9.2	9	.62	2.65	56.4	62.6	0	0	1	1	0	2	0
Yug	0	0	0	40.6	38	.51	2.03	69.1	54.0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0

Notes:

- 1) represents the country codes explained in Appendix 2
- 2) CPR = centre-periphery score; 1= centre; 0 = periphery (Rokkan 1970)
- 3) CORE = centre-periphery score; 2 = centre; 1= semi-periphery; 0 = periphery (Janos 1989)
- 4) WEST = west-east location; 2 = west; 1 = central Europe; 0 = east
- 5) RC1 =percentage roman catholics approx 1900 (Barrett 1982)
- 6) RC2 = percentage roman catholics approx 1900 (Shoup 1981)

- 7) ELF = ethno-linguistic fragmentation; fragmentation index (Tesniere 1928)
- 8) ELN = ethno-linguistic fragmentation, effective numbers (Tesniere 1928)
- 9) DOM 1 = percentage of population that belongs to the dominant language group (Tesniere 1928)
- 10) DOM2 = percentage of population that belongs to the dominant language group (Winkler 1930)
- 11) TODD = family structure, 2 = liberty & inequality; 1 = liberty or inequality; 0 = authoritarian and equal
- 12) GNP = approx. time for capitalist breakthrough; 1 = early breakthrough; 0 = late breakthrough; cf Bairoch 1982
- 13) AG1 = strength of an agrarian elite; 1 = strong elite; 0 = weak elite; cf Stephens 1989
- 14) AG2 = existence of large landowners; 1 large landowners; 0 = small landowners; cf Urwin 1980
- 15) CONST = continuity of representative institutions; the higher the value, the more of continuity; cf Myers 1975
- 16) MILIT = military war involvement in early modern history, the higher the value, the more of war involvement; cf Downing 1992
- 17) ELITE = existence of an elite settlement; 2 = an early settlement; 1 = late settlement; 0 = no settlement; cf Higley & Burton 1989, Burton et al. 1992

APPENDIX 2: Cases included in the analyses

Code	Nation-state	Code	Nation-state	Code	Nation-state
Alb	Albania	Gre	Greece	Por	Portugal
Aus	Austria	Hun	Hungary	Rom	Romania
Bel	Belgium	Ire	Ireland	Spa	Spain
Bul	Bulgaria	Ita	Italy	Swe	Sweden
Cze	Czechoslovakia	Lat	Latvia	Swi	Switzerland
Den	Denmark	Lit	Lithuania	UK	United Kingdom
Est	Estonia	Lux	Luxembourg	Rus	Russia/USSR
Fin	Finland	Net	Netherlands	Yug	Yugoslavia
Fra	France	Nor	Norway		
Ger	Germany	Pol	Poland		

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